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Introduction
The literature on South Korea's development has
generally recognised the importance of 'promotional'
economic policies by the Korean Government. I shall
argue here that 'directive' interventions have been very
important as well.'
The argument will be made through a case study of
South Korea's foreign direct investment policy, which
is widely believed to have been extremely liberal.
Indeed, has been described as 'one of the most liberal
investment laws in the world' [Kim 1979:viii;
Westphal et al 1979:365-6]. Such characterisations
may be found among orthodox and radical
economists alike, though they differ widely over its
consequences for the Korean economy. Whereas
orthodox economists generally emphasise the bene-
ficial effects to which such investments gave rise
[Krauss 1983:89], radical economists often refer
instead to the resulting 'denationalisation' of the
Korean economy - the passing of effective control
over the economy to outside agents, who operate it as
a cheap labour export-platform [Luther 1981:161;
Sunoo 1978:334-51.
This article reconsiders the nature and consequences
of Korea's policy towards foreign direct investment
(FDI). It aims to show first, that radical claims with
respect to the 'denationalisation' of the Korean
economy are unconvincing; second, that there has
been a substantial amount of directive state
intervention with respect to FDI in Korea, contrary to
earlier claims; and finally, that South Korea's
relatively successful interaction with FDI is due at
least in part to 'directive' policies.
Foreign Direct Investment: Inflows and
Impact
Arrivals of FDI in Korea were very small during the
Promotional measures are defined here as those which aim to
restore market forces to their proper functioning - such as
incentives, educational or infrastructural investments - whereas
directive measures are defined as those which aim to direct or
constrain market forces.
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1960s, and have remained at modest levels throughout
most of the 1970s (with the possible exception of the
1973-74 period). From 1972 to 1982 inclusive, average
annual arrivals of FDI were US$108 mn per year.
Total cumulative arrivals as of mid 1983 stood at
US$1,342 mn [Jeong 1983:4]. On a per capita basis,
FDI in Korea is the lowest among the four East Asian
newly industrialising countries (NICs), though it has
to be said that Korea is one of the largest borrowers of
loan funds in the world.2
Data on FDI flows to Korea .- by sector or country of
origin - have been readily available throughout the
last decade, as have discussions of such data and
outlines of the relevant laws and policies [Sano 1977;
Darton 1982; Jeong 1983]. In short supply, however,
are studies which attempt to discover how the policy
has operated in practice as opposed to on paper, or to
assess how FDI has affected the economy. Whereas
literature on the former issue is still lamentably rare, a
number of studies have recently been done on the
latter [Cohen 1972, 1975; Jo 1976; Ahn 1980; Lee
1980; Koo 1981, 1982; Park 1982]. By surveying their
findings, it is possible to throw light on the extent to
which foreign firms do or do not dominate the Korean
economy. We begin by considering the aggregate
picture.
We can see from Table I that the overall impact of
foreign firms is limited. Their role in Korea's exports
stabilised at around 23 per cent throughout most of
Nevertheless, all foreign borrowing has been strictly supervised and
controlled by the government to date so thai in this area also, any
'liberal-market' contentions can be challenged through the
identification of extensive 'directive' state intersentlon.
Many ofthe latter may be involved in international 'subcontracting'
arrangements [Sharpston l975 Hone l974 Berthomieu and
Hanaut 1980]. Whether these amount to de facto 'foreign control' is
debatable. The view taken here is that subcontractors are generally
more autonomous than foreign invested firms, hut that analytically
the 'control' issue should not be prejudged. Certainly some initially
'passive' subcontractors in Korea have over the time become much
more active in the marketing oftheir oms n products, thus decreasing
the scope for foreign control over them [Wortzet and Wortzel 19811.
the 1 970s [see J0 1980:144-5 for earlier figuresi, which
is to say that over three quarters of Korean exports are
accounted for by firms which are wholly Korean-
owned.3
Table 1
The role of foreign invested firms in Korea:
selected indicators for 1974 and 19781
Foreign firms are defined in official statistics as those which are not
wholly-owned by Koreans. The unusually broad scope of the
definition needs to be borne in mind when making international
comparisons.
Source: Koo 1981:38-43
Foreign invested firms accounted for 18 per cent of
manufacturing GNP in 1978 and 5.6 per cent of overall
GNP. True, their role has been rising rapidly between
1974 and 1978, but arguably it is not excessive, even in
manufacturing. The role of FDI in gross domestic
capital formation meanwhile has declined from 2.9 per
cent in 1974 to a negligible 0.7 per cent in 1978. And
finally, the role of foreign invested firms in total
employment for 1978 stood at below 10 per cent in
manufacturing and at a mere 2.3 per cent for the
economy as a whole.
It can be argued that the above figures overstate the
role of foreign firms. This is because the definition
employed considers all firms with any foreign equity
as foreign firms, whereas arguably only those where
management control is effectively in foreign hands
should be counted.
The difficulty lies in determining precisely at what
level of participation control effectively slips into
foreign hands. The rule of thumb often used is that of a
majority foreign ownership, where foreign equity
exceeds 50 per cent. By the middle of 1981, according
to such criteria, 41.6per cent of the cumulative foreign
direct tnvestment tn value terms was majority-foreign
owned, whereas 58.4 per cent was either majority-
Korean owned or 50/50 co-owned.4 But even such a
Source: Jeong 1983:10. Figures are based on approvals. The
breakdown is as follows: out (il a tota! amount of US$1221.8 mn.
23.3 per cent was majorit\-Korean owned. 35.1 per cent co-owned,
11.4 per cent majority foreign ou ned. and 3!).2 per cent was wholly-
foreign ois ned.
rule is not entirely satisfactory, given that according to
Korean Commercial Law, a 33.33 per cent equity
holding is sufficient to veto major corporate policy
changes such as capitalisation or articles of
incorporation [Business International Corporation
1983:9].
It is impossible to resolve the control issue here: suffice
it to say that the data used above are likely to overstate
the role of foreign companies in Korea, though it is
impossible to specify by how much. In any case, on the
basis of the above indicators at least, it would appear
difficult to sustain any denationalisation thesis.
Naturally there are significant sectoral variations:
within manufacturing, the chemicals (including
petroleum), and the electronics (including electrical
machinery) sectors stand out as the major areas of
FDI. Ifwe add to these the 'hotels and tourism' sector,
we have already accounted for over half of total
cumulative FDI in value terms as of mid 1983 [Jeong
1983:71.
Only in chemicals and electronics do foreign firms
have a major role in the economy (in terms of share of
output, employment and exports). Data on the
changing role of foreign firms over time suggest that
their dominance is being increasingly eroded by
domestic firms in these two sectors [Luedde-Neurath
1984]. None of these data are consistent with the
'denationalisation/export platform' thesis.
On the basis of the above evidence, we would suggest
that whereas the role of foreign invested firms is
significant in a number of respects and sectors in
Korea, it is by no means overwhelming. As for
Sunoo's claims that 'nine out of ten major trading
companies in South Korea are owned and operated by
the Japanese' [Sunoo 1978:323], and that 'more than
half of the foreign banks in Korea belong to Japan'
(335), they are contradicted by all serious empirical
evidence available [KEB: August 1978 and April 1982;
Smith 1979:v]. Denationalisation arguments are
therefore not convincing.
State Screening and Control over FDI
Now it is the turn of those writings which characterise
Korea's policy towards FDI as highly liberal. The
Korean Government has indeed actively promoted a
'liberal' image of its economy and its investment laws.
The 'liberal policy' thesis has fitted in nicely with the
theoretical preconceptions of both orthodox and
radical economists alike. Thus orthodox economists
found this characterisation useful given that to them,
'successful' cases of export-oriented development
must be based on market forces, and hence on liberal
policies. Radical economists - predicting doom for
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year unit per cent
u'eight offoreign firms in 1974 ¡978
Export value 23.0 22.8




Employment (total) 1.4 2.3
(manufacturing) 7.6 9.5
ldcs which interact with multinationals - readily
accepted the 'liberal' view because it enabled them to
dismiss Korea as merely a denationalised export-
platform of multinational capital. However con-
venient, such characterisations are false.
A review of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law and
its various enforcement decrees quickly casts doubt on
the liberal nature of Korea's FDI policy. We find that
considerations with respect to management control,
the balance of payments, technology transfer and
employment loom large in the screening process. We
also find an emphasis on ensuring the complementarity
between FDI and domestic firms in both export and
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domestic markets, and on ensuring the compatibility
of such investments with Korea's development
requirements and plans [Republic of Korea 1979]. It
also transpires that Korea uses a 'positive list' system
with respect to FDI, according to which all sectors are
closed to foreign investment unless otherwise specified
[Business International Corporation 1983; Ministry of
Finance 19821.
But are Korea's regulations anything unusual by
international standards, are are they actually enforced
in practice? The evidence is scant, but revealing.
Some years ago the UN Centre on Transnational
Corporations conducted a survey of investment















legislation in selected ldcs. It found that:
- out of 37 countries considered, only Korea and 10
others explicitly emphasised balance of payments
considerations among their screening criteria;
- out of a sample of 36, only Korea and eight others
explicitly granted preferential consideration to
joint ventures [UN 1978:36-7];
- out of 27 countries, only Korea and two others
considered all investment areas closed unless
otherwise specified. Indeed, 11 countries did not
explicitly specify any restricted areas [394O].
We suggest therefore, thàt by international com-
parison Korea's legislation towards FDI does not
stand out as particularly liberal, even it is true that
some types of investment have been granted very
generous incentives.
Turning to the question of policy enforcement, a
comparative survey of 187 US multinationals in 66
countries [Curham, Davidson and Suri 1977:315]
suggests that Korea has been relatively strict in
enforcing its policy with respect to local participation
in FDI. Out of all the investments made by these firms
in Korea as of January 1976 (37 cases), only 29.7 per
cent took the form of wholly owned subsidiaries. The
corresponding share in Japan was 33.1 per cent and
the average ratio for all countries in the sample was
69.1 per cent. Indeed, Koo calculates that Korea has
the lowest share of wholly owned subsidiaries in the
entire sample [1982:38].
A case study of a major US pharmaceutical firm which
considered but then abandoned plans to invest in
Korea suggests that a major stumbling block was
precisely the tough negotiating stand taken by the
Korean Government [United States Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce 1979:214-16].
The firm confronted - in some cases unacceptable -






- duration of service fees
Instructive is also the 'look behind the rhetoric' of
Korea's investment policy by Coolidge, a businessman
with extensive practical experience there. He argues
that Korea made the 'eye of the needle' for FDI rather
narrow, thereby making it fit with national priorities
[Coolidge 1980:376]. Foreign investors were expected
by their partners and by the Korean Government to
make a continuing contribution to Korean develop-
ment, one which was complementary to, rather than at
the expense of domestic manufacturing interests.
'Unless a foreign investor can be a continuous source
of new technology and markets, his position can only
decline regardless of what the Korean government's
written or unwritten guidelines might be' [383]. On the
whole, Coolidge's assessment is that the Korean
Government has been 'consistent and successful' in
attracting the FDI it considered desirable.
Meanwhile, informal interviews conducted by the
author in Seoul during February-March 1982, and
internal documents made available by foreign
businessmen, suggest as basic realities of foreign
investment in Korea:
- tight investment screening
- extensive government interference
- extensive reporting requirements and control
Tight screening
In Korea there indeed exists a gap between the law on
paper and the law in practice. But more often than not,
this works against the foreign investor rather than in
his favour. Not only are many areas of the Korean
ecoñomy closed to FDI, but those which are
supposedly open are not as open as they may appear.
This often becomes apparent only during the
screening process.
Most investment applications, though officially
handled by the Ministry of Finance (formerly by the
Economic Planning Board) as the 'one stop' clearing
agency, require the approval of various ministries.
These in turn base their decisions not merely on the
Foreign Capital Inducement Law and its enforcement
decrees, but also on a number of unpublished internal
regulations and guidelines. The latter are often more
important and more restrictive than the law itself.
Moreover, Korean bureaucrats at the working level
enjoy a considerable degree of 'administrative
freedom' with respect to how they interpret a given
law. The 'rule of men not law' is a concept deeply
imbedded in Korea's bureaucratic tradition [Hahm
1967:21], as is the basic - and historically correct -
view that foreigners come to Korea essentially to take
something away. Investment applications are therefore
considered very carefully, and the bureaucrat, viewing
patriotism as his personal duty, will raise objections to
applications he does not believe to be in the best
interest of Korea, even if the law or senior officials
label such investments as permissible. Problems of this
kind are aggravated by the fact that there exist no
formal procedures to appeal against the rejection of
applications.
Finally, there is the problem of disagreement and strife
among ministries. Quite regularly, banner headlines
announce policy liberalisations in Korea. Uninitiated
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foreigners take these at face value, assuming that they
signal the successful conclusion of interministerial
negotiations. In fact, given the rivalries,jealousies and
limited contacts among ministries, such announce-
ments often signal only the beginning of the debate
among them. Gradually and rather quietly the original
proposals are watered down - often beyond
recognition - in response to domestic opposition,
while no serious effort is made to dispel the myth
generated by the original announcement.
The net result of these factors is not only considerable
confusion and uncertainty among potential foreign
investors but also a foreign investment regime which is
much stricter in practice than it appears. The question
of course is whether such administrative obstacles are
intentional, dr merely a reflection of bureaucratic
inefficiency. Most people interviewed felt that there
was considerable method behind the witnessed
obstruction, precisely to stall foreign interests and to
protect domestic ones.
Extensive government interference
Foreign firms regularly complain about the high
degree of restrictions and interference to which they
are subject while operating in Korea.
Manufacturing enterprises, for example, are often
given precise instructions as to which products or
product lines they may produce and what share of
these may be sold on the domestic market. Guidelines
on pricing (eg of export inputs) are not uncommon.
Foreign banks are effectively barred from providing
export financing, competing for local currency
deposits, from buying real estate or from taking out
mortgages on it. Foreign insurance and leasing firms
are also severely restricted. This is done through
limitations in the 'scope of business', which must be
officially approved.
Foreign enterprises are often also denied the service
and support functions they consider necessary.
Samples, spare parts, training aids and business
technology are importable only with great difficulty, if
at all. Thus, contrary to the impression that might be
generated by some policy proclamations, foreign firms
can generally not compete on equal terms with local
firms on the domestic market.
Another areas of interference with foreign investors in
Korea relates to the 'sanctity of contract'. When
negotiating joint ventures or contracts with local
partners, foreign firms often assume that once an
agreement with them has been reached and signed, the
contract can be considered final. Not so. In Korea, the
government reserves the right to review and - where
necessary - demand changes in agreed contracts.
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This is known as 'round two' of the negotiations. In
1982 for example, the Economic Planning Board
reviewed 599 contracts between foreign and local
firms falling under the revised Fair Trade Law. It ruled
that 37.9 per cent of these would have to be revised in
favour of domestic interests involved [ACCKJ
January 1983:11-12].
Such attempts to renegotiate signed contracts occur
not only during the pre-investment phase, but on
occasion also once an agreement has been operating
for some time. Foreign firms may be asked to increase
their exports, raise the domestic content of their
output, to expand output, or even to restructure their
operations entirely. Laws affecting foreign investors
may be changed suddenly and in some cases applied
retroactively. Contracts may be unilaterally abrogated
when the assumptions underlying them change, and
Korea's extremely tight Foreign Exchange Control
Laws have in some cases been used to block the
payment of agreed service charges.
In this decade alone, the Korean Government has
already been engaged in some major disputes over
contractual issues, involving such eminent companies
as General Motors, Bechtel and Dow Chemical. Even
where the government ultimately climbed down, it
tended to reaffirm its basic right to demand changes in
contract. The basic government attitude appears to be
that business (whether domestic or foreign) should
serve the government and not vice versa.
Extensive reporting requirements and control
Foreign firms further complain about the reporting
requirements and bureaucratic control to which they
are subjected.
Foreign firms are required to disclose considerable
amounts of 'sensitive' information about their
accounts, products, projects, general operations and
their customers to Korean officials and screening
agencies. On several occasions such information has
ended up in the hands of domestic competitors or has
otherwise been used against the foreign firm. The laws
governing the protection of technology, particularly
with respect to industrial/intellectual property,
copyrights and trademarks are weak, and 'pirating' is
common. A related difficulty is that only processes,
but not products can be patented in Korea. In such an
environment, foreign firms are naturally reluctant to
supply sensitive information to the authorities, or to
transfer advanced technology to Korea.
Tax and customs officials in particular have a number
of independent means of monitoring company
activities. The statutory auditor, whose mission is to
check annually the integrity of company accounts,
acts as a powerful independent watchdog over all
major companies operating in Korea. Under proposed
revisions to the Commercial Code, his function is tobe
expanded substantially to that of constant (rather than
of annual) supervision of general (rather than of
strictly financial) aspects company activities [Birnbaum
1983:21-2]. Tax officials are known to conduct
independent assessments of company tax-liabilities
and to compare them against submitted accounts.
Customs officials meanwhile have at their disposal not
only very detailed international price lists, but detailed
records of virtually all international commercial
transactions involving Korea. A list is compiled daily,
by individual letter of credit, stating its number, the
nature of product, its country of origin, its supplier, its
purchaser, the volume involved and - perhaps most
importantly of all - the unit price of the transaction.
This detailed monitoring is said to be extremely
effective in curbing transfer pricing in Korea.
We do not wish to suggest that all investors are at all
times confronted with problems of the kind discussed.
But the problems are sufficiently common to support
the proposition that foreign investors in Korea do not
operate in a liberal environment. One can only agree
with Koo that 'the government was able to exert
comprehensive influences on the patterns of foreign
investment in Korea . . . competition with domestic
firms was seldom allowed, both in domestic and
export markets, and Korea became one of the few
countries with very restrictive foreign investment
regulations' [Koo 198 1:8].
As for the much publicised liberalisations of Korea's
investment regime, a US banker recently summed up
the feeling shared by many foreign bankers, investors
and traders: 'It's one thing to say that barriers are
coming down . . . it's another to see to it that foreign
bankers don't keep stumbling over them' [AWSJ, 28
March 1983].
Conclusion
Korea has not been denationalised by foreign
investors. It has not followed a liberal policy towards
FDI, but a highly selective one involving considerable
levels of directive state intervention.
How one evaluates such findings is largely a matter of
perspective. If one takes the view that all foreign
investment is good investment, one is likely to lament
the fact that artificial restrictions were imposed. If one
takes the opposite view, one is likely to lament the fact
that it was admitted at all. Such 'universalist' positions
are not helpful, however.
Foreign direct investment is essentially 'double-
edged': it has the potential to benefit and to harm Ide
development. There are many reasons why Ides must
and should resort to foreign direct investment, but the
dangers this option entails must be recognised.
Three things follow: firstly, the central issue is not
whether FDI is introduced into Ides, but precisely how
it is done. Secondly, directive state intervention is
necessary so as to insure the complementarity between
FDI and the domestic economy. Thirdly, the quality
of such directive intervention will be a crucial
determinant of whether FDI advances or retards Ide
development.5
If this position is accepted, a connection can be made
between the fact that rapid industrial development in
Korea was not based primarily on foreign firms, and
the fact that Korea pursued a policy of directive state
intervention with respect to FDI. The view taken is
that Korea was essentially on the right track when it
screened, restricted and controlled FDI, thereby
integrating it into its wider development strategy, and
that the development of Korean firms may owe much
to precisely such directive state intervention. That is
not to suggest that the policy was perfect, or that it is
not currently in urgent need of reform, only that it
appears to have served Korea rather well to date.
The policy implication for Korea is that the
widespread and unqualified calls often made for the
liberalisation of its foreign investment regime are
fundamentally misconceived. The solution for Korea
lies not simply in a reduction of directive state
intervention, but in its modification to root out
current inefficiencies and inconsistencies, and in its
adaptation to suit the requirements of the Korean
economy during the 1980s and 1990s.
For Ides, the implication is that the Korean experience
supports rather than contradicts the view that
directive state intervention is necessary if FDI is to
play a constructive role in national development. But
directive state Intervention is itself a potentially
problematic phenomenon. As orthodox economists
will correctly point out, misconceived, partial or
inefficient state intervention might be worse than none
at all. What such critics fail to recognise is that
governments are 'damned' not only if they intervene,
but also if they do not Intervene. Since it is almost
impossible to change the reality of foreign investment
as a 'double-edged' phenomenon, it is the quality of
government intervention which will have to be
improved.
The need to select and guide foreign ins estment is by now widel.
though by no means universails accepted ]L'nited Nations Centre
on lransnational Corporations 1983; OECD 977; Lai! and
Streeten 1977].
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